Instantly Integration Security Baseline
Overview
Produce a verified security baseline with least privilege and explicit remediation approvals. Record assumptions, evidence, approval state, and rollback ownership so another operator can reproduce the result.
Prerequisites
- The target repository, Instantly workspace, environment, and accountable owner
- Current security, privacy, compliance, capacity, and change-control requirements
- An approved API v2 key only when a bounded live verification is necessary
Tool Discipline
Use Read, Glob, and Grep to inspect code, configuration, and evidence. Use WebFetch only for current first-party Instantly documentation and package metadata. Use Write or Edit only when implementation was requested and exact target files are known; never write credentials, lead data, email content, or unrestricted environment output.
Current Contract
- Keys are bearer credentials displayed once; store them only in approved server-side secret systems.
- Scopes can be resource/action-specific and revoked through API-key controls.
- Webhook payloads can contain sensitive lead and message content; the public guide does not establish a signature secret.
Authentication
Use an API v2 key as Authorization: Bearer <key> against https://api.instantly.ai/api/v2. Grant only the endpoint-specific scopes needed, inject the key from an approved server-side secret manager, and never print, persist, commit, or place it in a URL. Treat key creation, rotation, revocation, member changes, workspace delegation, and production access as owner-approved actions.
Instructions
- Inventory secrets, scopes, members, service identities, workspace-group delegation, and webhook destinations.
- Remove browser exposure, query-string keys, plaintext configs, and unrestricted environment logging.
- Map each call to least-privilege scopes and validate denied operations.
- Enforce TLS, request-size bounds, schema validation, idempotency, and payload minimization at webhook receivers.
- Review audit logs and establish key rotation/revocation and incident ownership.
- Prepare changes with blast radius, approval, verification, and rollback evidence.
Approval Boundaries
Do not create, rotate, reveal, or revoke keys; invite or remove members; delegate across workspaces; connect sending accounts; create or activate campaigns; import or delete leads; change suppression or retention; register, patch, resume, or delete webhooks; alter plans or paid capacity; transmit diagnostics; or perform another production mutation without explicit approval from the accountable owner. Keep diagnosis read-only unless implementation was requested.
Output
Return the workspace-safe scope, files and contracts inspected, exact API v2 routes and required scopes, evidence collected, validation result, sensitive fields redacted, remaining risk, accountable owner, approval state, and rollback or next action.
Error Handling
| Condition | Response |
|---|---|
401 | Stop and verify that the bearer key exists, is current, and was not revoked. |
403 | Stop and compare the operation with its exact required scope; do not broaden to all:all by default. |
429 | Coordinate the workspace-wide budget, honor endpoint overrides, and bound retries. |
| Schema or tenant mismatch | Fail closed, preserve redacted evidence, and do not retry a mutation. |
Examples
Use a compact handoff that makes scope, mutation authority, and evidence reviewable.
Input:
mode=audit; secrets=references-only; webhook-signature=not-assumed
Expected handoff:
findings=prioritized; credentials=redacted; changes=awaiting-owner