detecting-command-injection-patterns

v2026.09.24

Scan a source tree for command-injection vulnerable patterns: shell=True calls in Python subprocess, os.system / os.popen with interpolated strings, Node child_process.exec with template literals, Ruby backticks / Kernel#system / Kernel#exec with interpolation, Go exec.Command with shell wrapping, PHP system / passthru / shell_exec / backticks with $-interpolation, Java Runtime.exec with concatenated args. Use when: pre-commit gate on code that calls out to shell utilities, audit of file-processing / archive-handling / image-conversion code, post-bug-report investigation for "we shell out to a tool." Threshold: any shell-invocation API called with a string that contains a variable interpolation, OR shell=True with anything other than a fixed literal. Trigger with: "scan command injection", "shell=True audit", "find exec calls", "check os.system".

GitHub
安装命令
npx skhub add jeremylongshore/detecting-command-injection-patterns
Markdown
SKILL.md

Detecting Command Injection Patterns

Overview

Command injection (CWE-78, OWASP A03:2021) shows up wherever an application shells out to a binary. Image conversion (convert), archive extraction (tar, unzip), video processing (ffmpeg), DNS lookup (dig), and "we just need to call this CLI tool once" are the common origins.

The vulnerability shape is universal: a string is built including user input, then handed to a shell interpreter. The shell parses the string with normal shell semantics — including ;, |, &, $(), backticks. Any of those in the user-controlled portion becomes shell-executable.

When the skill produces findings

FindingSeverityThresholdAffected control
Python subprocess.run(..., shell=True) with interpolationCRITICALf-string / concat / format argument with shell=TrueCWE-78
Python os.system(...) with interpolationCRITICALnon-literal argumentCWE-78
Python os.popen(...) with interpolationCRITICALnon-literal argumentCWE-78
Node child_process.exec(...) with template literalCRITICAL${...} in the command stringCWE-78
Node child_process.execSync(...) with templateCRITICALsameCWE-78
Ruby backticks with interpolationCRITICAL`cmd #{var}`CWE-78
Ruby Kernel#system(string) with interpolationCRITICALsystem("cmd #{var}")CWE-78
Go exec.Command("sh", "-c", ...) with interpolationHIGHshell wrapper with varCWE-78
PHP system / exec / passthru / shell_exec with $-interpCRITICALsystem("cmd $var")CWE-78
Java Runtime.exec(String) with concatHIGHsingle-string form (vs array) with varCWE-78

Prerequisites

  • Python 3.9+
  • Target source tree on local filesystem

Instructions

Step 1 — Run the scanner

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-command-injection-patterns/scripts/scan_cmdi.py /path/to/repo

Options:

Usage: scan_cmdi.py PATH [OPTIONS]

Options:
  --output FILE      Write findings to FILE
  --format FMT       json | jsonl | markdown (default: markdown)
  --min-severity SEV (default: info)
  --include-tests    Include test directories (default: excluded)
  --languages LIST   Comma-separated subset to scan

Step 2 — Interpret findings

CRITICAL = direct user-input → shell construction. Fix immediately.

HIGH = pattern where the shell layer exists but user-input reachability needs verification.

Step 3 — Remediation

The universal fix: pass arguments as a list (array), not a single string. Most APIs have a list form that bypasses shell entirely.

See references/PLAYBOOK.md for per-language patterns.

Examples

Example 1 — Pre-commit on a media-processing service

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-command-injection-patterns/scripts/scan_cmdi.py \
    --min-severity high $(git diff --name-only main...HEAD | tr '\n' ' ')

Example 2 — CI gate

- name: Command-injection scan
  run: |
    python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-command-injection-patterns/scripts/scan_cmdi.py \
        . --min-severity high

Output

JSON / JSONL / Markdown. Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 high/critical, 2 error.

Error Handling

False positives common in build scripts that interpolate fixed build constants. Verify each finding by reading whether the interpolated value is user-reachable.

Resources

  • references/THEORY.md — Why shell=True is the default footgun, per-language shell-out idioms, argument-vector vs command-string semantics
  • references/PLAYBOOK.md — Per-language safe-shellout patterns (Python subprocess list-args, Node spawn, Ruby Open3.capture3, Go exec.Command list-args, Java ProcessBuilder, PHP escapeshellarg)
发现
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版本
最新版本元数据

版本

v2026.09.24

发布时间

2026年9月24日

分类

未分类

许可证

MIT

源路径

skills/.curated/detecting-command-injection-patterns

默认分支

main

最新提交

e5a6c3b

Tree SHA

c2dc8e8