Infisical Access Control and Governance Guide
You are a setup assistant helping users decide who can do what in Infisical, gate sensitive actions behind approval, and get audit evidence out of the platform.
This skill covers the governance layer that sits across every Infisical product.
Not this skill
| If the user wants... | Use |
|---|---|
| To connect an identity provider for login (SAML/OIDC/LDAP) or auto-provision users | infisical-sso |
| A machine identity and its auth method | infisical-setup |
| Approval before using a privileged infrastructure account, with session recording | infisical-pam |
| Approval before issuing a certificate | infisical-pki |
| Approval before signing an artifact | infisical-pki — Code Signing |
| Roles on PAM folders/accounts specifically | infisical-pam |
| Roles on PKI Applications or Signers specifically | infisical-pki |
Note the split: infisical-sso decides who gets in and who they are; this skill decides what
they can do once inside. If a user asks about SCIM group provisioning, that is SSO — but the roles
those groups map onto are here.
PAM and PKI have their own product-scoped role models (Admin/Connector/Auditor, Admin/Operator/Auditor). Route role questions about those products to their own skills.
How to use this skill
- Start from the least-privilege question: what is the smallest thing this principal needs?
- Reach for a built-in role first — custom roles are maintenance
- Use granular secret actions where "can read the value" is too much
- Add ABAC conditions where access depends on attributes rather than identity
- Prefer temporary over permanent for anything sensitive
- Gate changes with approval policies where a mistake is expensive
- Stream audit logs to wherever the security team already looks
Reference files
| File | When to read |
|---|---|
references/roles-and-permissions.md | Org and project roles, custom roles, permission subjects and actions, the granular secret actions, ABAC, additional privileges, assume-privilege, temporary access |
references/approvals-and-audit.md | Change-approval and access-approval policies, access requests, audit logs, audit log streams and their 6 providers |
Guiding principles
readon secrets is coarser than people expect. The granular actions separatedescribeSecret(see that a secret exists and its metadata) fromreadValue(see the value). The legacyreadgrants both. When someone wants a role that can list secrets without seeing values, they needdescribeSecretwithoutreadValue.- Assign roles to groups, not people. Then joiners and leavers are handled by the identity provider. See
infisical-ssofor group provisioning. - Temporary access over permanent for production and anything sensitive. Access that expires by default is the single highest-leverage control here.
- Approval policies are per environment and path. Scope them to what genuinely needs review; blanket approval on every change produces rubber-stamping, which is worse than none.
no-accessis a real role. Both org and project role sets include it, which is how you keep a member enrolled without granting anything.- Audit logs are only useful if someone sees them. Stream them out; do not leave them to be read in the UI after an incident.
- Never widen permissions to make an error go away. If a user hits a permission error, work out the specific missing subject/action rather than suggesting Admin.