Using sops

Repositories that use this layout commit their secrets to git as sops-encrypted dotenv files, one per deployment environment: secrets/dev.env, secrets/prod.env. The files decrypt with age identities. There is no .env, no secrets service, and no session to log in to. Every checkout, worktree, and cloud sandbox has the encrypted files at clone; the only input anywhere is an age private key.

pnpm secrets (tools/secrets.ts) is the only interface. Do not call sops directly in a repo that has the wrapper.

Identities

.sops.yaml lists recipients by public key. Encrypting needs no private key; decrypting or editing needs one recipient's private key. agent and personal are local-development keys shared by every project; prod is minted per project so one leaked deploy variable exposes one project. These are conventions, not guaranteed recipients. Existing repos may use only shared dev and prod keys. Read the repository's secrets guide and .sops.yaml before choosing a key; the encrypted file's recipient metadata determines which identities can decrypt it.

Agent workflow

Dev secrets are yours to manage without asking:

pnpm secrets show dev                    # everything, decrypted
pnpm secrets get dev STRIPE_KEY
pnpm secrets set dev STRIPE_KEY sk_test_1
pnpm secrets unset dev STRIPE_KEY
pnpm secrets exec dev -- node apps/worker/src/main.ts

exec puts the decrypted values in the child's environment (over the shell's), removes SOPS_AGE_KEY* from it, forwards signals, and exits with the child's status.

When an authorized task needs production secrets, perform elevation yourself. Do not ask the user to run the command or reconfirm an already authorized task.

1. Check access with pnpm secrets exec prod -- true, which prints no secret values. An existing .age/elevated file alone does not prove that its key can decrypt prod.
2. If access fails, read the repo's secrets guide and recipient configuration. Use the documented account, vault, item, and field for a matching key. Do not assume a Personal vault, an age-personal recipient, or the CLI's default account.
3. Run the documented read yourself, piping the key directly into the wrapper: op read 'op://VAULT/ITEM/FIELD' --account ACCOUNT | pnpm secrets elevate. Replace the placeholders with the discovered identifiers; never print the key.
4. Confirm decryption with pnpm secrets exec prod -- true, then continue the task.

When the documented 1Password location is missing, use op account list --format json and op vault list --account ACCOUNT --format json to identify the correct account and vault. Search item metadata in that vault for the documented key name with op item list --account ACCOUNT --vault VAULT --format json; inspect only matching items. Pass --account on subsequent reads. Private, Personal, and Shared are distinct names, not interchangeable aliases. If a key is found but cannot decrypt, compare its public key with the file's recipients instead of repeatedly trying vault names. Keep private keys out of tool output.

Ask the user only when progress requires their interaction, such as unlocking 1Password or granting unavailable access. State the actual blocker. Elevation is per checkout and lasts until .age/elevated is deleted; do not copy it into another worktree.

When you add a variable, add it to the env schema and to every secrets/<env>.env you can decrypt. If you cannot decrypt prod, say so in the PR: the typed env check fails the prod boot until the value is set, which is the intended signal.

Never write an AGE-SECRET-KEY-... into a tracked file, a log, or a commit. Never put personal or prod in a cloud environment.

Human setup

For the one-time steps (generating keys, installing sops and age, wiring the agent key into agent tools and cloud sandboxes, configuring the prod platform, and rotating keys), read references/setup.md. When the user asks to be reminded of the steps, walk them through that file in order.

For the sops and age behavior the design relies on (identity union, updatekeys, exec-env limitations, dotenv quirks), read references/sops-notes.md.